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Abstract: Most theoretical and analytical discourse on national development identified the 
virulent nature of corruption as development curse. In Nigeria, as in many other soft states, the 
epidemic nature of corruption and its destructive impacts on the national development has 
received wider attention in both national and international mass media. Similarly, scholarly 
literature on the culture of sleaze in many of these countries revealed the depth of the disease. 
Nigeria, undoubtedly remain at the front page of countries under the siege of sleaze. Its profile 
as one of the most corrupt nations feeds largely into the crisis of its national development. 
Conceptually and theoretically, corruption encompassed very distinct social problems of 
mismanagement of public resources, weak and dysfunctional government institutions, complex 
relationships between political actors and public moral and economic assets. Indeed, the curse 
of corruption has assumed more than tantalizingly simple act of sleaze but a clear, complex and 
contested reality of national underdevelopment. It explains to a large extent the abuse of public 
power and misuse of entrusted power for private gain in the context of attaining national 
development. In this paper therefore, a continuation of the literature on corruption that espouses 
the interplay between the culture of greedy sleaze and national development is given bolder 
attention. The paper analyses a broad understandings of corruption from the analytical 
usefulness of an effective national development imperative. It further explains the interventionist 
roles of the ambitious anti-graft agencies and their contemporary challenges. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, national development, anti-graft agencies, Nigeria  
 
 
Introduction 
“No nation is going to create wealth if its political leaders exploit its economy to enrich 
themselves.  Thoughts and expose on corruption in Nigeria will continue to generate passionate 
debate and attention in Nigeria’s public space. As the thought and debate rages, the central 
argument of many public policy analysts is that the entrenched culture of sleaze in the public 
sphere is not only inimical to national development agenda but may lead to possible collapse of 
the Nigerian project. In contemporary Nigerian state, governance is gradually reducing to a 
veritable mechanism for economic saboteurs in the positions of power to illicitly boost and 
consolidate their economic strength and fortune to the detriment of the nation’s national 
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economic growth and development. In many cases, the financial appropriation in Nigeria is 
designed to accommodate the narrow interest of the few ruling cabals or act as buffets for the 
rulers. Corruption has become a trademark in the businesses of governance. The magnitude of 
corruption taking place in the corridors of power and other public institutions justified the 
criminal castration of some of the anti-graft agencies like the EFCC and ICPC by the economic 
vulture in the society. The culture of corrupt enrichment, the kleptomaniac tendencies and 
orchestrated thievery among public office holders have made the national development agenda 
unrealistic. Positions of authority have become a veritable means of siphoning, sharing and 
manipulating the commonwealth to cater for the parchment of the few privileged in the positions 
of political power (Babalola and Osoba, 2011). 
In recent years, the extent of resources mismanagement coupled with regimes of stealing 
of public fund has posed as a serious challenge to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
developmental transformation plans. Perhaps more worryingly is the absence of a coordinated 
agency of restraint or strategy for control to put corruption at its barest level. In fact, as it 
appears, the previous and present anti-graft agencies are at best ineffective, dysfunctional and 
impotent. Suffice is therefore to say the cure has been damaging than the disease. Institutional 
checks or agencies of restraint like judicial process has rarely resulted in any visible and lasting 
results, mostly because these institutions are equally undermined by the disease it intended to 
cure. Many are of them are also overwhelmed by the rampaging sleaze or at worst suffered from 
soft cursed syndrome and low level human capacity.  
The establishment of anti-corruption agencies like the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) that are seen as 
probably the most ambitious anti-corruption approach in contemporary developmental 
transformation contexts has at best underperformed considering the rampart cases of graft. In 
Nigeria, the ICPC and EFCC could not solve Nigeria’s massive corruption problem. During the 
Obasanjo administration, some high profile convictions were recorded such as the cases of Mr. 
Tafa Balogun (IGP), Mr. DSP Alamieyeseigha, Bode George and Chimaroke Nnamani. Despite 
this landmark effort, the judgment and conviction were laughable. In some extreme cases, anti-
graft agencies are nothing more than another layer of corrupt bureaucracy (Aluko, 2002) and in 
the context of the seemingly failure to convict the ‘big fishes’ the public see them seen as 
toothless bulldogs incapable of fighting the endemic corruption that has undermined the national 
development agenda in Nigeria.  
This paper acknowledges that there is no contestation that corruption in Nigeria’s is so 
intractable and damaging to broader public interests because so many who are responsible for 
these problems also hold high positions in the Nigerian state. Nigeria’s situation illustrates the 
‘criminalization of the state’, where government officials divert public resources for private 
benefit, using existing moral and political codes of behavior, especially those of ethnicity, 
kinship and even religion, and of cultural representations, notably of the invisible, of trickery as a 
social value, or prestigious styles of life, an aesthetic, whose capacity to legitimize certain types 
of behavior is considerable (Babalola, 1995). Corruption becomes an increasingly salient issue in 
development agenda in Nigeria. Both federal and state institutions in Nigeria offer an ideal 
environment for pervasive corruption; with their weak administrative institutions and often 
broken legal and judicial systems, they lack the capacity to effectively investigate and enforce 
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prohibitions of corrupt behavior.  
Moreover, the social norms that are expected to contain corruption tend to be weak or 
non-existent and divisions within societies affected by political and economic instability weaken 
shared conceptions of the public good (Akindele, 1990). Thus, since the inauguration of EFCC 
and ICPC as anti-graft agencies by the Act 2000. It has ever been saddled with the responsibility 
of preventing and fighting corruption. However, when compared to cases of corruption and the 
number of prosecution, these agencies are yet to score better. While they are sometimes 
perceived as tools of oppression by the ruling political party leaders little is known about various 
money and other recoveries made by the EFCC and ICPC. This paper therefore intends to situate 
the concept of corruption with the national development agenda. It specifically focuses on 
political corruption among political office holders and public administrators and examines the 
intervening roles, and obstacles of anti-graft agencies for national development. Conclusively, 
the paper contributes to the debate on endemic corruption by examining the specific conceptual 
and political challenges that corruption poses to Nigerian national development and 
transformation agenda.  
 
Explaining the Concept of Corruption 
Corruption has become one of the key lens through which reformers observe the political, 
institutional and social dynamics of governance in many developing countries. The growing 
awareness of corruption as a challenge in Nigerian national development project has resulted in 
the concept becoming a catch-all term. Invocations of corruption have encompassed very distinct 
social problems including the mismanagement of public assets, weak and dysfunctional 
government institutions, complex relationships between political actors and public economic 
assets. Some of the most popular and widely used definitions of corruption can appear 
tantalizingly simple and clear; it sometimes masked a more complex and contested reality. Thus, 
both the World Bank’s (2006) classic definition of corruption as “the abuse of public power for 
private gain”, or Transparency International’s conception as “the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”, have been popular with many scholars not only because they are relatively broad 
definitions that capture a wide range of corrupt practices, but possibly also because they suggest 
that corrupt behavior can be easily identified, classified and addressed through neat institutional 
solutions. The analyses, however, suggest that such broad understandings of corruption not only 
undermine the analytical usefulness of the term, but they also make the development of effective 
national development policies more difficult. While the many different social problems often 
subsumed under the label ‘corruption’ could challenge a peaceful and prosperous order, each one 
requires a distinct response and cannot be understood through the same conceptual lens and 
addressed using the same instrument. 
Defining corruption is also complicated by the fact that as a social and political concept, 
its content changes across different social, political and cultural contexts. Practices that are 
considered corrupt in some countries might be considered as proper and legitimate in others. For 
example, in some countries, there are special expectations of a public office holder which arise 
from family and kinship ties; and some actions, even if they are popularly described and 
regarded as ‘corrupt’, constitute an essential part of social and political life (Osoba, 1996). As 
Ogundiya (2009) has argued, most contemporary understandings of corruption require a clear 
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and established distinction between private and public spheres with public authority organized 
and legitimized along the lines of Weberian legal-rational authority. Where alternative sources of 
political authority, in particular authority based on traditions of kinship, are competing with state 
institutions, and the distinction between public and private are blurred, corruption is more 
difficult to identify, as public and private duties often overlap. The difficulty of comparing cases 
and developing policy prescriptions becomes plain when there is not even agreement on the 
content of the basic concept under discussion. 
Despite this recognition of the cultural specificity of the content of corruption, a range of 
scholars have identified what Mike (2002) has called an ‘objective core’ of corruption that can 
help to capture the essence of the concept across different social and political contexts. Mike 
suggests that common to all understandings of corruption is its subversion of rules governing 
public office. Similarly, Lawal and Oladunjoye (2010) identify three key elements of corruption: 
Corruption relies on the existence of a well-developed distinction between the public and private 
sphere, which breaks down in phases of corruption; Corruption involves administrative or 
political favors in exchange for inducements,  which can be financial but can also take other 
forms, not least the form of refraining from violence against the official or politician providing 
the favor; and Corruption involves a violation of shared norms of public office. While such an 
approach to defining corruption does not get around the problem that different scholars can have 
different perceptions of whether the act is corrupt or not based on varying societal and cultural 
norms, this approach does suggest that a qualified systematic and comparative analysis of 
corruption is possible.  
An alternative path to defining corruption focuses not on a structure, but argues that what 
distinguishes corruption from other forms of malfeasance is that it is a moral concept. Mauro 
(1998), for example, claims that what is missing from most definitions of corruption is that it ‘is 
an explicitly moral notion: corruption describes, in general parlance, a powerful, all-consuming 
evil’. There are several problems with such an approach first, it suggests the existence of a set of 
universal norms that corruption violates the existence of such a strong normative consensus on 
the content of corruption, however, is doubtful. Second, and equally important, such a moral 
approach deprives us of analytical focus and precision. It excludes a priory the possibility that 
different forms of corruption might be harmful in different ways and to different degrees; or that 
corruption might even be beneficial, if only in the short term, and at a certain cost, for example 
by sustaining a relatively stable order that might be unequal and unjust, but which minimizes 
violence (Onyeoziri, 2004). 
It also ignores the possibility that corruption might be a very rational response to the 
situation within which the individuals find themselves, and be a central part of their coping and 
survival strategies (Obadan, 2002). Third, such a conceptualization of corruption brings with it 
major problems for national development policy. While developing environments appear to be 
especially prone to corruption, and while corruption can compromise national development 
efforts, fighting corruption is not the only objective of development actors-nor is it necessarily 
the most important one. Enabling corruption might be a price economy developers have to pay to 
ensure the participation of different factions in a holistic agreement and to end large scale fraud. 
If corruption were to be seen as an ‘all destructive evil’, it is difficult to see how such trade-offs 
could ever be morally justified. National development involves difficult political and moral 
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choices, and by turning corruption into an absolute moral question, it effectively becomes 
impossible to prioritize amongst different economic development objectives. In the light of 
complexity of the concept of corruption, one way to improve the understanding of its 
consequences for national development efforts is to distinguish between different forms of 
corruption. Three possible ways of refining the concept standout: first, by contrasting grand and 
petty corruption; second, by differentiating corruption across sectors; and third, by examining 
different practices classed as being corrupt. 
One of the most common distinctions that is made in the literature and by policy makers 
is between ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption, at times also referred to as political and administrative 
corruption, or as state capture and administrative corruption(World Bank 2006). Despite the 
misleading terminology, the grand-petty distinction is not concerned with the scale of corrupt 
activity, but rather the level at which it takes place- either in political leadership, or the 
bureaucracy that implements and administers policy. While the former has undoubtedly had a 
greater impact on the practices and functioning of the political system because it sustains 
networks of patronage and distorts the laws and procedures of the government (rather than just 
their implementation), it is petty corruption that is experienced more directly by public office 
holders in its daily interactions with the state, for example through favors granted and bribes paid 
regularly to the public and private officials (Ogundiya, 2012). While the impact of these 
individuals’ acts of corruption on the overall peace building process may be minimal, it 
undermines citizens’ trust in the state. Additionally, petty corruption can become a vehicle for 
targeting ethnic and political groups; in this way, the routine nature of petty corruption can 
destroy the perception of state neutrality. 
The second way to refine the analysis of corruption is to distinguish between corruptions 
in different sectors (Justice, security, procurement) as they defer in importance between different 
developing countries. In jurisdictions with substantial natural resources such as oil or diamond, 
corruption in the regulation of this sectors and the trade in these commodities is likely to be 
central challenge to development efforts (Epele, 2006). In countries with substantial natural 
resources such as Nigeria, government procurement and control of publically owned enterprises 
is key site of corruption (Ibrahim, 2003).  
In Nigerian state, it is generally believed that the police and justice system are weak and 
often perceived to be among the most corrupt institutions. Corruption in these sectors is 
practically problematic as they create the (often justified) perception that some group or 
individuals can act with impunity. This limiting trust in some of these institutions creates a sense 
of insecurity, thereby undermining and feeding into a large scale national development effort. In 
the aftermath of the military rule in Nigeria, for example, Nigerian judges and prosecutors 
display a strong bias in favor of few rich political elites against common or less privilege 
citizens, while the less privilege citizens could barely get a fair trial (sometimes facing the 
detention without charges). (Onuogu, 2002)  
Finally, one can distinguish between different practices classified as corruption. Babatope 
distinguishes between eight different forms of corruption: fraud, illegal political bargains, 
embezzlement, bribery, favoritism, extortion, the abuse of discretion and conflict of interest 
(Babatope, 2008).  Ochulor et al. (2011) limit themselves to five main forms of corruption-
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and favoritism while Asaolu identifies seven basic forms 
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of corruption from a study of corruption in Nigeria (Asaolu, 2013). This includes commission for 
illicit services, unwarranted payment for public services, gratuities, string-pulling, levies and 
tolls sidelining and misappropriation. Broadly, these different list agree on the kinds of practices 
that constitute corruption, but importantly many of them, such as favoritism, the abuse of 
discretion, or string-pulling can only be meaningfully examined and judged in their specific 
social context. Therefore, focusing on different forms of corruption does not avoid the pitfall of 
specific societal understandings of the concept. It can help, however, with analyzing the specific 
pathways of corruption in different developing environment, and their impact on economic 
development efforts. It can help, however, to analyze the specific cases of corrupt government 
officials in Nigerian governance [see the Table 1.1 below]. 
 
Table 1.1: High Profile Cases of Corruption Trends in Nigerian Governance [2000-2014] 
High Profile Cases 2000-2013 
Ayo Fayose, former 
governor, Ekiti State   
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 51 state counts, 
Plea already taken but defence 
lawyer keeps filling frivolous 
applications for long 
adjournments to frustrate and 
prolong trial. 
N1.2 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2007 
Inherited 
cases filled 
since 17th 
Dec.2006 
Joshua Dariye, former 
governor, Plateau 
State  
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Gudu 
Arraigned on 23 state counts. 
Plea already taken but defence 
lawyer challenged court 
jurisdiction. Case stalled at 
High Court while on appeal 
for stay of trial. This is part of 
calculated attempt to prolong 
trial 
N700 
million 
Granted bail  
by court 
since 2007 
Inherited 
Cases filed 
since 13th  
July 2007 
Saminu Turaki, former 
governor, Jigawa State   
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 32 state counts. 
Plea already taken but defence 
lawyer challenged   court at 
High Court while seeking stay 
of trial at appeal court. It is 
part of usual attempt to 
frustrate and prolong trial 
 N36 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2007 
Inherited 
case filled 
since 13th 
July, 2007 
Orji Uzor Kalu, 
former governor, Abia 
State      
Federal  High 
Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 107 state counts.  
Plea already taken but defence 
lawyer raised preliminary 
objection   against charges. 
Lost at trial court but has gone 
on trial. It is part of usual 
attempt to prolong trial. 
  N5 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 
 
 
 
 
 
Inherited 
cases filed 
since 11th 
June, 2007 
James Ibori, former 
governor, Delta State    
Federal High 
Court,  Asaba 
Arraigned on 170 state counts. 
Defence lawyer challenged 
Kaduna Federal Court 
jurisdiction lost at trial court 
but won at appeal court. Case 
reassigned by CJ to Asaba 
FHC. Without taking plea, 
N9.2 
billion 
Granted ball 
by court 
since 2008  
Sentenced 
by UK 
Court 
Inherited   
fresh 
charges  
filed in 
August, 
2009 
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suspect applied to quash 
charges, prosecution but trial 
judge quash the charges 
Dec.19.  EFCC filed appeal 
Dec.  23, 2009 
Lucky  Igbinedion, 
former governor of 
Edo State 
Federal High 
Court, Enugu 
Arraigned on 191 state counts. 
Applied for plea bargain and 
Convicted but EFCC has 
appealed the judgment to seek 
for stiffer sanctions 
N4.3 
billion 
Case 
determined 
Inherited 
case filed on 
23rd Jan. 
2008 
Gabriel Aduku, former 
FCT   minister of 
health   
Federal High 
Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 56 state counts. 
Court judgment on no case 
against suspect under review 
by EFCC 
N300 
million 
Case 
determined 
in 2008 
Inherited 
Case filed 
on 2nd 
April, 2008 
Jolly Nyame, former 
governor of Taraba 
State  
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 21 state counts. 
Plea already taken but case is 
stalled as defence lawyer 
challenged court jurisdiction. 
Lost at HC, Appeal court, now 
before supreme court. This is a 
typical example of frivolous 
appeal to buy time and 
prolong trial. 
N180 
million 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Inherited  
Case filed 
since 13th 
July 2007 
Chimaroke Nnamani, 
former governor of 
Enugu State   
Federal High 
Court, Lagos, 
State 
Arraigned on 105 state counts. 
Plea already taken but case is 
stalled as defence lawyer filed 
to transfer case to another 
judge on allegation of bias 
against trial judge even as 
counsel has filed to challenge 
court jurisdiction. This is 
equally an attempt to prolong 
trial 
N5.3 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2007 
Inherited 
case filed 
since 11th 
December, 
2007 
Michael Botmang 
former governor  of 
Plateau State 
Federal High 
Court, 
Maitama  
Arraigned on 31 state counts 
plea already taken but trial 
stalled due to suspects aliment, 
on dialysis 
N1.5 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 18th 
July2008 
(Granted 
bail on 
health 
grounds) 
Roland Iyayi, former    
managing  director of 
FAAN 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 11 state counts. 
Plea already taken. Trial on 
going Court taking 
prosecution witnesses 
testimony 
N5.6 
billion 
 Commenced 
by Waziri in 
June 2008 
Kenny Martins (Police 
Equipment Fund) 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 28 amended 
state counts. Plea already 
taken and trial ongoing. 
Witnesses under cross 
examination Continuation of 
trial fixed for Nov.9 
N774 
million  
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
June 
2008(Accus
ed set free 
by Federal 
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High Court, 
Abuja) 
Nyeson Wike, former 
chief of staff to 
governor of rivers 
state 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on state count. 
Court quashed charges. EFCC 
already appealed judgment. 
Appeal pending at appeal 
court. 
N4.67
0 
billion 
Granted ball 
by the court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on Oct.9 
2008(case 
still in court) 
Professor  Babalola 
Borishade,  former 
minister of aviation 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on 11 state counts. 
Plea already taken and trial 
ongoing. Prosecution  
witnesses under cross 
examination 
N5.5 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
June 
2008(still in 
court) 
Boni Haruna, former 
governor, Adamawa 
State 
Fed. High 
Court, 
Maitama 
Arraigned on amended 28 
state counts. Plea taken. 
Adoption of motion slated for 
Nov 
N254 
million 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
2008 
Femi Fani-Kayode, 
former minister of 
aviation 
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 47 state count 
plea taken but case stalled as a 
result of trial court’s refusal to 
admit e-print of suspect’s 
statement of account as 
evidence.  EFFC on appeal 
against the decision. Matter 
pending at appeal court 
N250 
million 
Granted bail 
by court in 
2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
2008 
Prince Ibrahim 
Dumuje (Police 
Equipment Fund) 
FCT High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 28 amended 
state counts. Plea taken and 
trial ongoing. Prosecution 
witnesses under cross 
examination. Continuation  
fixed for Nov. 9 
N774 
million 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
2008 
Bode George, 
chieftain of the ruling 
party, PDP 
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 68 state counts. 
Plea taken and trial concluded. 
N100 
billion 
Accused 
convicted 
and 
sentenced to 
2 years. V 
Convict on 
appeal while 
serving jail 
term 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
Dec.08(acqu
itted and 
sentenced 
quashed by 
supreme 
court) 
(December 
2013) 
Rasheed Ladoja, 
former governor of 
Oyo State  
Federal High 
Court, Lagos 
Arraigned on 33 state counts. 
Plea taken and trial ongoing 
Prosecution witnesses slated 
for cross examination in Nov. 
N6 
billion 
Granted bail 
by court 
since 2008 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
Nicholas Ugbade, 
serving senator) Hon. 
Ndudi Elumelu, Hon. 
Paulinus Igwe, serving 
members of House of 
Representatives Dr. 
Abdullahi (serving 
fed. perm.sec) Mr. 
Federal 
Capital 
Territory 
High court, 
Abuja 
Plea taken while prosecution 
has filed more charges against 
suspects. Suspects filed to 
quash charges but application 
thrown out by court. 
N5.2 
billion 
Remanded 
in prison 
custody and 
later granted 
bail by court 
in 2009 
Commenced 
by Waziri in 
May 2009 
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Samuel Ibi, Mr. Simon 
Nanle, Mr. Lawrence 
Orekoya, Mr. Kayode 
Oyedeji, Mr. A Garba 
Jahun, (This is the 
rural electrification 
three serving members 
of the House of 
Representatives, the 
permanent secretary of 
the ministry of power 
and other high profile 
public officers) 
Prof B. Sokan, Molkat 
Mutfwang, Michael 
Aule, Andrew 
Ekpanobi, (all 
directors) Alexander 
Cozman (MD, 
Intermarket Ltd) (This 
is the UBEC case 
where high profile 
public servants 
connived with an 
American, Alexander 
Cozman) to defraud 
government. Dr 
Ransome Owan, Mr. 
Abdulrahman Ado, 
Mr. Abdulrasak Alimi, 
Mr. Onwuamaeze 
iloeje, Mrs. Grace 
Eyoma, Mr. 
Mohammed Bunu, Mr. 
Abimbola Odubiyi 
(This is the Nigeria 
Electricity Regulatory 
Commission case 
where the chairman 
and his six 
commissioners 
corruptly enriched 
themselves) Dr. 
Yuguda Manu 
Kaigama, chairman, 
Taraba State Civil 
Service Commission 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taraba State 
High Court 5, 
Jalingo 
Arraigned on 64 state 
counts. Plea taken while 
more charges were filed 
against suspects due to 
appearance of Prof. Sokan. 
Matter adjourned to Nov 9 
for suspects to take plea on 
amended charges 
 
Arraigned on 196 state 
counts. Plea taken. Trial 
billed to commence while 
more charges were filed 
against suspects. Further  
hearing slated for Oct 29 
Tom Iseghohi, Muhammed 
Buba, Mike Okoli, (GM and 
Managers of Transport 
Group PLC) 
 
 
 
Arraigned on 37 state 
counts. Plea taken and 
matter adjourned for trial 
N636 
million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N1.5 
billion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N17 
million 
Suspects  
remanded in 
prison 
custody and 
later granted 
bail by court 
in 2009 
 
 
Granted bail 
by court in 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suspect 
remanded in 
prison 
custody. Co-
accused, 
Yakubu 
Danjuma 
Takun, at 
large. 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on May 19 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 22nd 
April, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 10th 
October,  
2009 
Dr (Mrs)  Cecilia Ibru 
former CEO, Oceanic 
Bank PLC) 
Federal High 
Court Ikoyi, 
Lagos Justice 
Dan Abutu 
Arraigned on 25 state 
counts. Plea taken and case 
adjourned to November for 
trial 
N160.2 
billion 
Suspect 
remanded in 
EFCC 
custody, but 
granted bail 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on Aug 31 
2009 
(convicted 
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on 14/9/09 and 
sentenced to 
6 months 
jail term). 
Francis Atuche, 
former CEO, Bank 
PHB 
Federal High 
Court, Ikoyi, 
Lagos. 
Arraigned on 26 count 
charge Plea taken. Suspect 
challenged charges but court 
upheld charges Matter set for 
trial 
N180 
billion 
Suspect 
remanded 
and later 
granted bail 
by court. His 
assets 
frozen. 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 28th 
October, 
2009 
Adamu Abdullahi, 
former governor of 
Nasarawa State 
Federal High 
Court, Lafia 
Nasarawa 
Arraigned on 149 court 
charges. Suspect granted bail 
by court. Case slated for 
trial. 
N15 
billion 
Suspect  on 
court bail 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 3rd 
March, 2010 
Attahiru Bafarawa, 
former governor of 
Sokoto State 
Sokoto State 
High Court 
Arraigned on 47 count 
charge 
N15 
billion 
Suspect 
remanded in 
prison 
custody and 
later granted 
bail by 
court. Case 
slated for 
trial 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 16th 
December, 
2009 
Francis Okokuro, 
Bayelsa State 
accountant general 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
Arraigned on 47 count 
charge 
N2.4 
billion 
Suspect 
remanded in 
prison 
custody till 
April 13 
Commenced 
by Waziri 
on 24th 
March, 2010 
(case 
adjourned to 
January 23, 
2014) 
Sources: Tell Magazine, 9 January 2014 pp 21-23 
 
It should be noted from Table 1.1 that in all these cases of corruption none of the culprits is 
currently being detained or serving jail term apart from James Ibori, the former governor of Delta 
State who is currently being jailed in the United Kingdom, a clear indication of the failure of the 
Nigerian judiciary to prosecute politicians and ex-public officials. Even Ayo Fayose, who is a 
chief culprit on the list, has recently been re-elected as the governor of Ekiti state.Also, the 
inclusion of one of the most corrupt political office holders Mr. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha in the 
ongoing national conference play down the seriousness of the government to fight corruption in 
high places. Giving these two scenarios where these offenders are not held accountable for their 
corrupt crimes, and are in fact rewarded with political appointments, corruption in Nigerian 
governance can therefore be described as a viper draining the blood of the Nigerian state. Also, 
in a situation where political elites have been prosecuted and jailed, they are usually given a light 
jail term, and granted amnesty prior to completing their terms in jail. 
 
Anti-Graft Agencies in Nigeria ICPC and EFCC 
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The most focused and far-reaching war against corruption in Nigeria could be said to have 
started during the regime of the erstwhile president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo 
especially with the establishment of the two Anti-graft bodies; The ICPC and the EFCC. On 
assumption of office, Obasanjo (2000) noted that the impact of corruption is so rampant and has 
earned Nigeria a very bad image. The new dispensation offered by his election gave President 
Obasanjo an opportunity that was required to prelaunch Nigeria to her rightful place in the 
comity of nations. Thus, the first bill of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and, thus the first bill he 
presented to the National parliament for consideration was the ICPC Act which was signed into 
law in June 2000. On September 29, 2000, the ICPC was established. The new ICPC, designed 
to reflect relevant public and private experience was mandated to employ all available legal 
means to rid Nigeria of all vestiges of corruption and to promote transparency and integrity in the 
public and private lives of all Nigerians. It is mandated to receive and investigate any report of 
the conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit or the commission of such offence and, in 
appropriate cases, to prosecute the offenders (ICPC, 2000). It also has the mandate to review, 
examine, and enforce the modification of such structures and systems that are vulnerable to 
corruption as well as to criminalize a wide range of direct and indirect corrupt practices in public 
and private institutions (FRN, ICPC, 2002). 
In 2003, the EFCC was founded. Its first establishment Act of 2002 was repealed by a bill 
of the national assembly and reenacted as EFCC Establishment Act, 2004. Its establishment was 
meant to satisfy one of the conditions of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to 
remove Nigeria from the list of recalcitrant countries in international financial transactions. Its 
mandate, among others, was to cause investigation to be conducted into the properties of any 
person if it appears to the commission that the person’s life style and extent of the properties are 
not justified by his source of income (EFCC, 2004). That broad mandate would cover such areas 
as corruption in public office, terrorist financing, oil bunkering and 419 scam. 419 is a section of 
chapter 38 of Nigerian Criminal Code (Obtaining Property by false pretenses; Cheating) that 
deals with fraud. The scam, also known as advance-fee fraud is a confidence trick where letters 
or e-mails are sent to different recipients, proposing profitable offers that will pay the intended 
targets substantially. The scammers use false official documents like government letter headed 
papers, seals, stamps to make look real. After some time, the target is convinced to advance sums 
of money inform of taxes, fees, and/or handling charges for the release of the funds. Its first 
chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, was seconded to head the commission from the Police force when the 
agency was created. In 2005, EFCC scored its first break when Tafa Balogun, former Inspector-
General of Police was sentenced to a six month jail term for corruption (EFCC, 2004). The 
establishment of the anti-graft commissions was in line with the relevant section of Nigerian 
constitution which empowered the national legislature to expose corruption, inefficiency or 
waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the 
disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it (CFRN, 2004). 
However, federal government war against corruption, the EFCC was set up to combat the 
threats posed by money launderers and other organized trans-border criminals operating in 
Nigeria. The author included statistics of prosecutions, convictions, and funds recovered to show 
that the EFCC was more effective than the ICPCC during the period under review. But the data 
relied upon apparently did of take into account the fact that the ICPC focuses on public sector 
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crimes, while the EFCC mandate embraces both the public and private sector. Without 
disaggregated data it would be impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the two 
agencies using prosecutions, convictions, and recoveries as parameters.  
Accordingly, it is believed that any unbiased comparison of the achievements of the 
EFCC and the ICPC in the areas of prosecution and recovery of proceeds of corruption has to 
take into account the differences in their mandates and their operational jurisdictions. It will also 
not be fair to conclude that it was only the activities of the EFCC that resulted in positive 
changes in the perception of corruption in Nigeria by Transparency International and the Paris 
Club; other anti-graft agencies should partake of glory and credit for the contributions however 
insignificant they may appear. It must however be observed that instead creating the EFCC, 
ICPC’s enabling law ought to have been amended to broaden the agency’s mandate to include 
corruption in the private sector. Even if there was an overriding need to create another agency, 
the jurisdiction of the new agency should have been limited to corruption in the private sector, 
thereby leaving public sector corruption to the ICPC. With the creation of the EFCC we now 
have two main anti-graft agencies dealing with public sector corruption, with ill-defined 
jurisdictional boundaries and operational limits. 
The result is the collateral turf war and struggle for supremacy amongst the agencies, 
stepping on one another toes, sabotaging and undermining one another, seeking credit and 
applause, self-aggrandizement by leadership of the agencies, and playing to the gallery instead of 
getting the job done. The establishment of the two bodies provided great impetus for the press to 
perform the constitutionally ordained role of effectively watching over the activities of the 
government so as to ensure efficient survive delivery. Despite the strident criticism that the war 
was biased and the agencies were being used to witch-hunt enemies of the government, it is still 
provided great support to the ant-graft agencies in its activities. The ICPC Act21 vests in the 
officers of the Commission, all the powers and immunities of a police officer under the Police 
Act and any other laws conferring power on the police, or empowering and protecting law 
enforcement agents. Section 6 of the ICPC Act confers three main responsibilities on the 
commission. They include receiving and investigating reports of corruption and, in appropriate 
cases, prosecuting the offenders; examining, reviewing and enforcing the correction of 
corruption prone systems and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating corruption 
in public life. The mandate also involves educating and enlightening the public on and against 
corruption and related offences with a view to enlisting and fostering public support for the fight 
against corruption. Section 61 of the Act states that any prosecution for an offence under the Act 
is deemed to be done with the consent of the Attorney-General. Under section 13 (2) (a) of the 
EFCC Act22 the Legal and Prosecution Unit of the Commission is charged with the 
responsibility of prosecuting offenders under the Act. There has been a longstanding controversy 
over the independence of the ICPC, EFCC and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, regarding whether 
they should seek permission and approval of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice before 
initiating prosecutions. Late President Umaru Yar’Adua had directed that all agencies involved 
in the prosecution of criminal cases should seek the consent of the Attorney–General. In 
addition, the agencies are also to report to the Attorney-General of the Federation in accordance 
with relevant laws.  
And, recently, the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, 
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Mohammed Bello Adoke, advocated the merger of the nation’s anti-corruption agencies, the 
EFCC with the ICPC (Akanbi, 2001). Adoke alleged that as a result of incompetence, inadequate 
capacity to thoroughly investigate and prosecute economic crimes, many high profile corruption 
cases, such as the $180m Halliburton bribe scandal, the alleged N50bn Police Equipment Fund 
fraud and the #3billion Vaswani Brothers rice importation scandal, failed as the agencies lack 
capacity to collate evidences to sustain charges and secure conviction in court (Eme, 2010). The 
Attorney-General of the Federation further argued that the two anti-graft agencies seemed not to 
understand their roles and statutory mandates as they conflict more than agree over jurisdictional 
issues when “the Act establishing the ICPC mandates it to fight official corruption while the Act 
setting up EFCC mandates it to fight economic crimes and money laundering.” In addition, he 
also posited that the mandates of the two commissions overlap (Aiyede, 2008). Similarly, a 
former Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice announced while in office that 
the Federal Government was considering merging the EFCC and ICPC because of overlapping 
functions (Daily Trust, 2007).  
These anti-graft agencies were referred to as ‘white elephant security agencies.” The 
argument has always been that proliferation of crime-busting agencies has undermined the 
effectiveness of the police culminating in frequent friction amongst the agencies over issues of 
mandate and jurisdiction. To compound the situation the current Attorney-General recently 
promulgated a controversial Statutory Instrument pursuant to his powers under section 43 of the 
EFCC Act of 2004 to the effect that all cases under the purview of EFCC must be cleared with 
the Attorney-General before prosecution (Waziri, 2010). The instrument attracted much public 
criticism but it has not been revoked. It must be mentioned that the position taken by the above 
mentioned public officers is not popular with the public. Indeed, failure of the police to 
investigate and successfully prosecute corruption and allied cases was the main catalyst for the 
establishment of these agencies at various times. While recognizing that the operations of the 
agencies have room for improvement scrapping or merging them with the Police will compound 
an already bad situation. Reform of these institutions, especially the anti-corruption agencies, 
must emphasize the need to work together. Mandatory and regular exchange of information and 
intelligence by the agencies, in the overall interest of the country, must be enforced. 
 
Obstacles to Anti-Graft Efforts in Nigeria 
As the article shows, anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria have focused on strengthening state 
capacity; on increasing transparency in decision-making, especially in spending decisions; and 
on the accountability of public actors, through both formal and informal monitoring processes. 
However, despite the substantial resources dedicated to these efforts, its impacts on corruption 
has been limited, with most Nigerian states lingering at the bottom of national corruption and 
governance indices. Looking at the emergence of Nigerian leaders and their anti-corruption 
efforts in strategic operations which boils down to recycling of old leaders at the helm of affairs, 
it only shows the reasons why corruption has remained such a problem. Three issues stand out: 
nationalizing governance functions; an emphasis on formal institutions and a focus on state-
institutions. 
Firstly, a substantial number of strategic operations have witnessed the nationalization of 
governance functions, either comprehensively, as with democratic administrations in Nigeria 
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(Falana, 2006), or more selectively, with nationals controlling the budgetary powers, or the 
justice system. Examples of the latter include ICPC in Nigeria that introduced local experts with 
co-signature authority into key ministries and public enterprise to enhance transparency and 
accountability, especially with regard to revenue collection, procurement and spending decisions 
(Waziri, 2010). While aiming to enhance transparency and accountability, such nationalized set-
ups also aim to strengthen the capacity of these institutions and train local officials. In some 
respects, such mechanisms have been quite successful: ICPC contributed to a tripling in Nigerian 
revenues, while EFCC has begun to investigate a senior government minister and popular former 
governors for corruption associated with different cases or issues. However, all such mechanisms 
face obvious problems of sustainability, for if they fail to address the underlying organization of 
corruption and the social and economic structures that fuel it, corrupt officials can simply choose 
to wait out the national presence. Because of the fact that these types of intrusive anti-corruption 
mechanisms compromise norms of sovereignty and self-governance, they can be politically 
costly to maintain and fuel local resistance to the wider national strategic effort. 
Secondly, in EFCC and ICPC anti-corruption efforts, strategic operations have focused 
on building and strengthening formal anti-corruption institutions, such as anti-corruption 
commissions, the judiciary, and procurement systems based on federal/or national best practices. 
However, these efforts often fall short as anti-corruption institutions are sufficiently resourced 
and insulated from political influence. As highlights, they can only be effective if they have 
strong political support, have adequate financial resources, and are given a strong official 
mandate. However, it is rarely in the interests of political elites to establish independent and 
well-resourced institutions that threaten the networks that sustain their power. In Nigeria, for 
example, the anti-corruption agencies have lacked substantial political support, and have been 
starved of funds and with a small staff they have no capacity to investigate corruption allegations 
(Tony, 2008). In addition, the focus on strengthening anti-corruption institutions is rooted in the 
idea that weak formal institutions in Nigeria fuel corruption. However, as the study show, 
corruption in Nigeria is also the consequences of concomitant informal power structure that fuel 
and shape relationships of corruption. Such efforts to strengthen formal institutions are rarely 
accompanied by similar efforts to weaken or co-opt these informal structures, limiting the impact 
of anti-corruption reforms, as highlighted. 
Lastly, federal governments tend to focus their anti-corruption efforts predominantly on 
the actions and institutions of the state, rather than on the practices of public and private 
international institutions such as business, NGOs, or International organizations. However, in 
Nigerian states one cannot really understand-let alone successfully fight-corruption without 
attending to the role of international actors/or institutions and structures because the scale of aid 
and the way in which it is disbursed, has important consequences for corruption. Similarly, the 
exploitation of natural resources and the networks of corruption that accompany it are 
inextricably linked to international markets. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, federal 
government anti-corruption efforts have focused predominantly on the role of the Nigerian state-
despite the fact that external actors and structures play an important role. 
A recent assessment by the Save Nigeria Group (SNG) notes a glaring lack of primary 
data that would allow for comparisons between programs on how and where donors have 
allocated funds (Daily Trust, 2010). While civil society has undertaken similar efforts through 
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campaigns to encourage transparency and accountability in the natural resources sector, Ribadu 
(2006) argues that with the growing national competition for national resources, the desire of 
federal government to put pressure on mining companies has declined. Instead, the emphasis has 
shifted to encouraging recipient developing governments to be more transparent about our 
natural resource income under the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. On the 
other, as a consequence of an effective campaign by anti-corruption NGOs in Nigeria, the 2013 
financial reform bill included provisions requiring resource extraction companies to disclose all 
payments made to federal governments for oil, gas or minerals. As the bill takes effect, it will 
become clearer whether these efforts to enhance transparency will have the desired effect on 
corruption.  
 
Impact of Corruption on National Development 
Is corruption always so damaging to state capacity to develop or to the concept of national 
development? At the very least, limiting anti-corruption efforts of EFCC and ICPC may be an 
important ingredient in mollifying elites who are in a position to disrupt critical policies. The 
Punch argues that toleration of some corruption prior to the 1999 elections in Nigeria enabled 
relative newcomers to enter politics as political leaders busied themselves with the business of 
making money. This avoided the consolidation of wartime incumbents in politics; yet their stakes 
in the economy, corrupt through these were, brought them into politics in a more pluralist 
fashion (The Punch, 2011). There is a common assumption that corruption has a negative impact 
on state building outcomes (Punch, 2008). Indeed, the harmful impact of corruption in 
developmental building in Nigeria has been a dominant discourse amongst policymakers and 
local media (The Punch, 2008), in particular with regard to Nigeria. Much of the general 
scholarly literature on corruption further underscores its harmful effects (Sorkaa, 2002).  
There is no doubt about the substantial social and economic costs of corruption, such as 
lower economic growth (Agbonifo, 1985) and growing inequality (Epele, 2006). In addition, 
corruption has been associated with the undermining of trust in Nigerian society (Akindele, 
1990), the increase in political instability (Bassey, 1997), how Nigerian citizens feel about the 
performance of their democracy (Adelekan, 2012), and the entrenchment of patronage networks 
and political elites (Akinbi, 1999). Despite the fact that corruption poses a strong threat to 
economic development, political stability, good governance and state legitimacy, in Nigeria the 
costs of corruption need to be seen in the wider context of state building, and the additional 
competing priorities that arise from such environments. 
 
Can corruption be overcome? 
There is no doubt that corruption is many-faceted and can be deeply rooted within countries 
without good governance. Consequently, no one-dimensional measure will fully tackle the 
problem. Certainly, the political and determination of good leaders is essential but it may not be 
sufficient. There must be institutional reform and increased accountability of the judiciary, 
legislature, security services and other institutions of government. But again, without adequately 
trained, educated and rigorous personnel, these institutions may be weak and ineffective. Legal 
systems must focus attention on procurement processes and not be afraid or uncertain of 
prosecuting powerful and important people if they are suspected of engaging in corrupt practices.  
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A free media and active, sophisticated civil society both play an important role in shining 
a light on corruption. The international community’s emphasis on anti-corruption is useful but 
should not lead to purely cosmetic organizations being set up in states that are keen to tick the 
boxes of multilateral donors. Any anti-corruption institution set up simply to meet the 
requirements of federal and state governments will be neither effective nor efficient. Equally, the 
business practices of Nigeria. Grand corruption and looting cannot be addressed without the 
skilled assistance of foreign countries, especially when monies have been spirited away to 
foreign banks. Asset of the developing Nigeria must not exacerbate or be complicit in corrupt 
arrangements with governments recovery is now gaining far greater attention. The International 
organizations also have an important role to play in both alerting the global environment to the 
menace of corruption and providing a framework for tackling the issue in Nigeria. Although it 
has tended to concentrate on advocacy, it has become pro-active on certain occasions. For 
example, some international institutions held a panel on the illegal exploitation of the mineral 
resources in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria. If corrupt practices are viewed as a part of everyday life 
about which little or nothing can be done, a deep malaise spreads over the whole of society with 
pernicious effects on all sectors: political, economic, legal and business. In short, every aspect of 
the nation becomes tainted with corruption. Although Transparency International found there 
were some grounds for optimism in Nigeria’s anti-corruption measures, there was a considerable 
‘gap between commitments and actions’. Ultimately, it concluded ‘greater political commitment 
is required if Nigerian governments are to be effective in combating corruption’ (Transparency 
International 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
Knowledge about controlling corruption is more limited than is generally recognized and 
especially thin where corruption significantly impedes establishing the rule of law. This is not 
just because corruption is a hidden or concealed activity. At the moment, knowledge is drawn 
from only Nigeria where the results of corruption investigations have been publicized. Although 
the forms of corruption may seem similar globally, the particulars of who does what, when, and 
how vary considerably. Understanding these particulars is essential for formulating programs of 
remediation. Even less is known about either the contextual conditions or programmatic tactics 
that determine success in anti-corruption agencies reform. Efforts at reform, rare as they are, 
have not been systematically evaluated; they have rarely been even adequately described. This 
may change due to the creation of permanent, independent agencies in several countries that 
monitor and report on corruption. At the moment, however, there are little more than scattered 
anecdotes about what works. 
People working in economic intervention and governance reconstruction tend to be 
pessimistic about the prospects for reducing corruption. It seems to be an endemic problem over 
which foreign donors have little leverage. Pessimism is justified. Not only are there operational 
problems of insecurity, unreliable personnel, and dysfunctional institutions, but corruption is 
supported by social structures and attitudes that are embedded in local ways of life. It can seem 
as if reducing corruption requires ambitious nation building and the transformation of local 
cultures. At the same time, there are a few examples of successful corruption reduction. Nigeria 
made a concerted attack on corruption in the 2009, establishing an EFCC. In the 2011, following 
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the report of the EFCC, the state of Nigeria, created a permanent, independent Criminal Justice 
Commission to oversee performance throughout the justice system. Unfortunately, the success of 
these efforts in Nigeria seems to be short term, as little as twenty years. Even more worrying, the 
examples cited come from relatively prosperous and political stable. This reinforces the 
pessimistic view that corruption reform requires conditions unlikely to be found in the world’s 
most troubled places-unless, of course, foreign intervention is undertaken on a long-term, nation-
building scale. 
Insufficient as knowledge is about reducing corruption, any international efforts to foster 
and support the rule of law must prioritize attacking corruption. To do otherwise is to be as 
willfully blind as executives who blame “bad apples” for systemic misbehavior. All programs 
seeking to strengthen the rule of law should insist on creating programs that eliminate corruption 
in the forms that matter most too local populations. Reformers need not solve the problem across 
the board in governmental sectors, or forever. But they must begin. Eliminating corruption in its 
most blatant forms should be a required condition for any foreign assistance program undertaken 
to facilitate democratic governance. 
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